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Abstract
The convenience of 802.11-based wireless access
networks has led to widespread deployment in the
consumer, industrial and military sectors. However,
this use is predicated on an implicit assumption
of conﬁdentiality and availability. While the secu
rity ﬂaws in 802.11’s basic conﬁdentially mechanisms
have been widely publicized, the threats to network
availability are far less widely appreciated. In fact,
it has been suggested that 802.11 is highly suscepti
ble to malicious denial-of-service (DoS) attacks tar
geting its management and media access protocols.
This paper provides an experimental analysis of such
802.11-speciﬁc attacks – their practicality, their ef
ﬁcacy and potential low-overhead implementation
changes to mitigate the underlying vulnerabilities.

1

Introduction

The combination of free spectrum, eﬃcient
channel coding and cheap interface hardware have
made 802.11-based access networks extremely pop
ular. For a couple hundred dollars a user can buy
an 802.11 access point that seamlessly extends their
existing network connectivity for almost 100 meters.
As a result, the market for 802.11-based LANs ex
ceeded $1 Billion in 2001 and includes widespread
use in the home, enterprise and government/military
sectors, as well as an emerging market in public area
wireless networks. However, this same widespread
deployment makes 802.11-based networks an attrac
tive target for potential attackers. Indeed, recent
research has demonstrated basic ﬂaws in 802.11’s
encryption mechanisms [FMS01, BGW01] and au
thentication protocols [ASJZ01] – ultimately lead
ing to the creation of a series of protocol extensions
and replacements (e.g., WPA, 802.11i, 802.1X) to
address these problems. However, most of this work
has focused primarily on the requirements of access
control and conﬁdentiality, rather than availability.
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In contrast, this paper focuses on the threats
posed by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against
802.11’s MAC protocol. Such attacks, which pre
vent legitimate users from accessing the network, are
a vexing problem in all networks, but they are par
ticularly threatening in the wireless context. With
out a physical infrastructure, an attacker is aﬀorded
considerable ﬂexibility in deciding where and when
to attack, as well as enhanced anonymity due to the
diﬃculty in locating the source of individual wireless
transmissions. Moreover, the relative immaturity of
802.11-based network management tools makes it
unlikely that a well-planned attack will be quickly
diagnosed. Finally, as we will show, vulnerabilities
in the 802.11 MAC protocol allow an attacker to se
lectively or completely disrupt service to the network
using relatively few packets and low power consump
tion.
This paper makes four principal contributions.
First, we provide a description of vulnerabilities in
the 802.11 management and media access services
that are vulnerable to attack. Second, we demon
strate that all such attacks are practical to im
plement by circumventing the normal operation of
the ﬁrmware in commodity 802.11 devices. Third,
we implement two important classes of denial-of
service attacks and investigate the range of their
practical eﬀectiveness. Finally, we describe, imple
ment and evaluate non-cryptographic countermea
sures that can be implemented in the ﬁrmware of
existing MAC hardware.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 describes related security research con
ducted by others in academia, as well as unpub
lished, but contemporaneous, work from the “black
hat” security community. Section 3 describes and
categorizes existing denial-of-service vulnerabilities
in 802.11’s MAC protocol. In Section 4 we use live
experiments and simulation to analyze the practical
ity and eﬃcacy of these attacks, followed by an eval
uation of low-overhead countermeasures to mitigate
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the underlying vulnerabilities. Finally, we summa
rize our ﬁndings in Section 5.

2

Related Work

A great deal of research has already been fo
cused on 802.11 network security. Most of this work
has focused on weaknesses in the wired equivalency
protocol (WEP) intended to provide data privacy
between 802.11 clients and access points. WEP re
lies on shared secret keys to support a challengeresponse authentication protocol and for encrypting
data packets. In 2001, Fluhrer et al. identiﬁed recur
ring weak keys in WEP, and showed how to use them
to recover the secret key [FMS01]. Once the key is
known, an attacker can both fully utilize network
resources and monitor the traﬃc of other network
nodes. In a recent paper, Stubbleﬁeld et al., demon
strate an implementation of this attack that was able
to recover a 128-bit WEP key purely through passive
monitoring [SIR02]. In addition, Borisov et al. have
identiﬁed vulnerabilities that allow WEP-protected
frames to be modiﬁed, new frames to be injected,
authentication frames to be spoofed and plain text
to be recovered from encrypted frames – all without
knowing the shared secret key [BGW01].
While these works comprise the best known
body of 802.11 security research, there has also been
some attention focused on denial-of-service vulner
abilities unique to 802.11. As part of his PhD the
sis, Lough identiﬁes a number of security vulnera
bilities in the 802.11 MAC protocol, including those
that lead to the deauthentication/disassociation and
virtual carrier-sense attacks presented in this pa
per [Lou01]. However, while Lough’s thesis iden
tiﬁes these vulnerabilities, it does not validate them
empirically. We demonstrate that such validation is
critical to assessing the true threat of such attacks.
In addition to Lough’s work, Faria and Cheri
ton consider the problems posed by authentication
DoS attacks. They identify those assumption viola
tions that lead to the vulnerabilities and propose a
new authentication framework to address the prob
lems [FC02]. Unlike their work, this paper focuses
on validating the impact of the attacks and develop
ing light-weight solutions that do not require signif
icant changes to existing standards or extensive use
of cryptography.
The deauthentication/disassociation attack is
fairly straightforward to implement and while writ
ing this paper we discovered several in the “black
hat” community who had done so before us. Lack
ing publication dates it is diﬃcult to determine the

16

ordering of these eﬀorts, but we are aware of three
implementations to date: one by Baird and Lynn
(AirJack) presented at BlackHat Brieﬁngs in July
of 2002, another due to Schiﬀman and presented
at the same event (Omerta), and a tool by Floeter
(void11) that appears to be roughly contemporae
nous [LB02, Sch02, Flo02]. As part of his imple
mentation, Schiﬀman also discusses a general pur
pose toolkit, called Radiate, for injecting raw 802.11
frames into the channel. However, since this toolkit
works through the ﬁrmware it is only able to gener
ate a subset of legitimate 802.11 frames. Compared
to this previous work, our contribution lies in eval
uating the impact of the attack, providing a cheap
means to mitigate such attacks and in providing an
infrastructure for mounting a wider class of attacks
(including the virtual carrier-sense attack).
Congestion-based MAC layer denial of service
attacks have also been studied previously. Gupta et
al. examined DoS attacks in 802.11 ad hoc networks
and show that traditional wireline-based detection
and prevention approaches do not work, and pro
pose the use of MAC layer fairness to mitigate the
problem [GKF02]. Kyasanur and Vaidya also look
at congestion-based MAC DoS attacks, but from a
general 802.11 prospective, not the purely ad hoc
prospective [KV03]. They propose a straightforward
method for detecting such attacks. In addition they
propose and simulate a defense where uncompro
mised nodes cooperate to control the frame rate at
the compromised node. Compared to these papers,
we focus on attacks on the 802.11 MAC protocol it
self rather than pure resource consumption attacks.
Finally, to provide a long-term solution to
802.11’s security problems, the 802.11 TGi work
ing group has proposed the standard use of the
802.1X protocol [IEE01] for authentication in fu
ture versions of 802.11 products, in addition to both
short-term and long-term modiﬁcations to the pri
vacy functions. However, while the working group
is clearly aware of threats from unauthenticated
management frames and spoofed control frames
(e.g., [Abo02, Moo02]), to the best of our knowl
edge there is no protection against such attacks in
the current drafts under discussion.

3

Vulnerabilities

The 802.11 MAC layer incorporates functional
ity uniquely designed to address problems speciﬁc
to wireless networks. In particular, this includes
the ability to discover networks, join and leave net
works, and coordinate access to the radio medium.
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The vulnerabilities discussed in this section result
directly from this additional functionality and can
be broadly placed into two categories: identity and
media-access control.

3.1

Client

Attacker

AP

Authentication Request

Identity Vulnerabilities
Authentication Response

Identity vulnerabilities arise from the implicit
trust 802.11 networks place in a speaker’s source
address. As is the case with wired Ethernet hosts,
802.11 nodes are identiﬁed at the MAC layer with
globally unique 12 byte addresses. A ﬁeld in the
MAC frame holds both the senders and the receivers
addresses, as reported by the sender of the frame.
For “class one” frames, including most management
and control messages, standard 802.11 networks do
not include any mechanism for verifying the correct
ness of the self-reported identity. Consequently, an
attacker may “spoof” other nodes and request var
ious MAC-layer services on their behalf. This leads
to several distinct vulnerabilities.

Association Request

Association Response

Deauthentication
Data

Deauthentication
3.1.1

Deauthentication

Exemplifying this problem is the deauthentication
attack. After an 802.11 client has selected an access
point to use for communication, it must ﬁrst authen
ticate itself to the AP before further communication
may commence. Moreover, part of the authentica
tion framework is a message that allows clients and
access points to explicitly request deauthentication
from one another. Unfortunately, this message it
self is not authenticated using any keying material.
Consequently the attacker may spoof this message,
either pretending to be the access point or the client,
and direct it to the other party (see Figure 1). In
response, the access point or client will exit the au
thenticated state and will refuse all further pack
ets until authentication is reestablished. How long
reestablishment takes is a function of how aggres
sively the client will attempt to reauthenticate and
any higher-level timeouts or backoﬀs that may sup
press the demand for communication. By repeating
the attack persistently a client may be kept from
transmitting or receiving data indeﬁnitely.
One of the strengths of this attack is its great
ﬂexibility: an attacker may elect to deny access to
individual clients, or even rate limit their access, in
addition to simply denying service to the entire chan
nel. However, accomplishing these goals eﬃciently
requires the attacker to promiscuously monitor the
channel and send deauthentication messages only
when a new authentication has successfully taken
place (indicated by the client’s attempt to associate
with the access point). As well, to prevent a client
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Figure 1: Graphical depiction of the deauthentica
tion attack. Note that the attacker needs only gen
erate one packet for every six exchanged between the
client and access point.
from “escaping” to a neighboring access point, the
attacker must periodically scan all channels to en
sure that the client has not switched to another over
lapping access point.
3.1.2

Disassociation

A very similar vulnerability may be found in the as
sociation protocol that follows authentication. Since
a client may be authenticated with multiple access
points at once, the 802.11 standard provides a spe
cial association message to allow the client and ac
cess point to agree which access point shall have
responsibility for forwarding packets to and from
the wired network on the client’s behalf. As with
authentication, association frames are unauthenti
cated, and 802.11 provides a disassociation message
similar to the deauthentication message described
earlier. Exploiting this vulnerability is functionally
identical to the deauthentication attack. However,
it is worth noting that the disassociation attack is
slightly less eﬃcient than the deauthentication at
tack. This is because deauthentication forces the
victim node to do more work to return to the as-
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sociated state than does disassociation, ultimately
requiring less work on the part of the attacker.
3.1.3

Power Saving

The power conservation functions of 802.11 also
present several identity-based vulnerabilities. To
conserve energy, clients are allowed to enter a sleep
state during which they are unable to transmit or
receive. Before entering the sleep state the client
announces its intention so the access point can start
buﬀering any inbound traﬃc for the node. Occasion
ally the client awakens and polls the access point for
any pending traﬃc. If there is any buﬀered data
at this time, the access point delivers it and subse
quently discards the contents of its buﬀer. By spoof
ing the polling message on behalf of the client, an
attacker cay cause the access point to discard the
clients packets while it is asleep.
Along the same vein, it is potentially possible
to trick the client node into thinking there are no
buﬀered packets at the access point when in fact
there are. The presence of buﬀered packets is indi
cated in a periodically broadcast packet called the
traﬃc indication map, or TIM. If the TIM message
itself is spoofed, an attacker may convince a client
that there is no pending data for it and the client
will immediately revert back to the sleep state.
Finally, the power conservation mechanisms rely
on time synchronization between the access point
and its clients so clients know when to awake. Key
synchronization information, such as the period of
TIM packets and a timestamp broadcast by the ac
cess point, are sent unauthenticated and in the clear.
By forging these management packets, an attacker
can cause a client node to fall out of sync with the
access point and fail to wake up at the appropriate
times.
While all of the vulnerabilities in this section
could be resolved with appropriate authentication
of all messages, it seems unlikely that such a capa
bility will emerge soon. With an installed base of
over 15 million legacy 802.11 devices, the enormous
growth of the public-area wireless access market and
the managerial burden imposed by the shared key
management of 802.1X, it seems unlikely that there
will be universal deployment of mutual authenti
cation infrastructure any time soon. Moreover, it
is not clear whether future versions of the 802.11
speciﬁcation will protect management frames such
as deauthentication (while it is clear they are aware
of the problem, the current work of the TGi work
ing group still leaves the deauthentication operation
unprotected).
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3.2

Media Access Vulnerabilities

802.11 networks go through signiﬁcant eﬀort to
avoid transmit collisions. Due to hidden terminals
perfect collision detection is not possible and a com
bination of physical carrier-sense and virtual carriersense mechanisms are employed in tandem to con
trol access to the channel [BDSZ94]. Both of these
mechanisms may be exploited by an attacker.
First, to prioritize access to the radio medium
four time windows are deﬁned. For the purposes of
this discussion only two are important: the Short
Interframe Space (SIFS) and the longer Distributed
Coordination Function Interframe Space (DIFS).
Before any frame can be sent the sending radio must
observe a quiet medium for one of the deﬁned win
dow periods. The SIFS window is used for frames
sent as part of a preexisting frame exchange (for ex
ample, the explicit ACK frame sent in response to
a previously transmitted data frame). The DIFS
window is used for nodes wishing to initiate a new
frame exchange. To avoid all nodes transmitting im
mediately after the DIFS expires, the time after the
DIFS is subdivided into slots. Each transmitting
node randomly and with equal probability picks a
slot in which to start transmitting. If a collision
does occur (indicated implicitly by the lack of an im
mediate acknowledgment), the sender uses a random
exponential backoﬀ algorithm before retransmitting.
Since every transmitting node must wait at least
an SIFS interval, if not longer, an attacker may com
pletely monopolize the channel by sending a short
signal before the end of every SIFS period. While
this attack would likely be highly eﬀective, it also
requires the attacker to expend considerable energy.
A SIFS period is only 20 microseconds on 802.11b
networks, leading to a duty cycle of 50,000 packets
per second in order to disable all access to the net
work.
A more serious vulnerability arises from the vir
tual carrier-sense mechanism used to mitigate col
lisions from hidden terminals. Each 802.11 frame
carries a Duration ﬁeld that indicates the number
of microseconds that the channel is reserved. This
value, in turn, is used to program the Network Al
location Vector (NAV) on each node. Only when
a node’s NAV reaches 0 is it allowed to transmit.
This feature is principally used by the explicit re
quest to send (RTS) / clear to send (CTS) hand
shake that can be used to synchronize access to the
channel when a hidden terminal may be interfering
with transmissions.
During this handshake the sending node ﬁrst
sends a small RTS frame that includes a duration
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Figure 2: Graphical depiction of the virtual carrier-sense attack in action. The gradient portion of the
attacker’s frame indicates time reserved by the duration ﬁeld although no data is actually sent. Continually
sending the attack frames back to back prevents other nodes from sending legitimate frames.
large enough to complete the RTS/CTS sequence –
including the CTS frame, the data frame, and the
subsequent acknowledgment frame. The destination
node replies to the RTS with a CTS, containing a
new duration ﬁeld updated to account for the time
already elapsed during the sequence. After the CTS
is sent, every node in radio range of either the send
ing or receiving node will have updated their NAV
and will defer all transmissions for the duration of
the future transaction. While the RTS/CTS fea
ture is rarely used in practice, respecting the virtual
carrier-sense function indicated by the duration ﬁeld
is mandatory in all 802.11 implementations.
An attacker may exploit this feature by assert
ing a large duration ﬁeld, thereby preventing wellbehaved clients from gaining access to the channel
(as shown in Figure 2). While it is possible to use
almost any frame type to control the NAV, including
an ACK, using the RTS has some advantages. Since
a well-behaved node will always respond to RTS with
a CTS, an attacker may co-opt legitimate nodes to
propagate the attack further than it could on its
own. Moreover, this approach allows an attacker to
transmit with extremely low power or using a direc
tional antennae, thereby reducing the probability of
being located.
The maximum value for the NAV is 32767, or
roughly 32 milliseconds on 802.11b networks, so in
principal an attacker need only transmit approxi
mately 30 times a second to jam all access to the
channel. Finally, it is worth noting that RTS, CTS
and ACK frames are not authenticated in any cur
rent or upcoming 802.11 standard. However, even
if they were authenticated, this would only provide
non-repudiation since, by design, the virtual-carrier
sense feature impacts all nodes on the same channel.
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4

Practical Attacks and Defenses

While the previous vulnerabilities are severe in
principal, understanding their true threat potential
requires evaluating the practicality of implementing
them and how well they perform in practice. In this
section we examine these issues as well as discussing
the eﬃcacy of several low-overhead defense mecha
nisms.

4.1

802.11 Attack Infrastructure

From a purely practical perspective, a key en
gineering question is, “Can an attack be gener
ated with commodity hardware?” While theoreti
cal vulnerabilities are clearly important, we feel that
attacks with software implementations represent a
qualitatively greater threat since they are available
to a dramatically expanded set of potential attack
ers.
At ﬁrst glance this appears to be a trivial prob
lem since all 802.11 Network Interface Cards (NIC)
are inherently able to generate arbitrary frames.
However, in practice, all 802.11(a,b) devices we are
aware of implement key MAC functions in ﬁrmware
and moderate access to the radio through a con
strained interface. The implementation of this
ﬁrmware, in turn, dictates the limits of how a NIC
can be used by an attacker. Indeed, in reviewing
preprints of this paper, several 802.11 experts de
clared the virtual carrier-sense attack infeasible in
practice due to such limitations.
In testing a wide variety of 802.11 NICs we have
found that most allow the generation of management
frames necessary to exploit the identity attacks de
scribed earlier – typically using semi-documented or
undocumented modes of operation, such as HostAP
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Radio Modem Interface
Figure 3: A block diagram depicting how the “aux
port” can be used to circumvent the limitations im
posed by the ﬁrmware. By using this raw memory
interface, the host can transform “normal” packets
into arbitrary 802.11 frames as they are transmitted.
and HostBSS mode in Intersil ﬁrmware. However,
these same devices do not typically allow the gener
ation of any control frames, permit other key ﬁelds
(such as Duration and FCS) to be speciﬁed by the
host, or allow reserved or illegal ﬁeld values to be
transmitted. Instead, the ﬁrmware overwrites these
ﬁelds with appropriate values after the host requests
that queued data be transmitted. While it might
be possible to reverse-engineer the ﬁrmware to re
move this limitation, we believe the eﬀort to do so
would be considerable. Instead, we have developed
an alternative mechanism to sidestep the limitations
imposed by the ﬁrmware interface. To understand
our approach it is ﬁrst necessary to understand the
architecture of existing 802.11 products.
Most commodity 802.11 devices, including those
using Intersil Prism, Lucent/Agere/Orinoco/Proxim
Hermes and Cisco Aironet chipsets are based on an
initial MAC design originated by Choice Microsys
tems (since acquired by Intersil). In this architec
ture, all low-level functions – including frame trans
mission, scheduling, acknowledgement, and frag
mentation – are implemented in ﬁrmware while
the host is simply responsible for managing data
transfer to and from the device. Data transfer is
achieved through a ﬁrmware-implemented “Buﬀer
Access Path” (BAP) that shields the driver writer
from the details of NIC memory management and
synchronization. While the BAP interface will typ

20

ically accept raw 802.11 frames, these packets are
then further interpreted by concurrent ﬁrmware pro
cesses. As a result, only a subset of potential frames
can be successfully transmitted by the host.
However, Choice-based MACs also provide an
unbuﬀered, unsychronized raw memory access inter
face for debug purposes – typically called the “aux
port”. By properly conﬁguring the host and NIC, it
is possible to write a frame via the BAP interface,
locate it in the NIC’s SRAM, request a transmission,
and then modify the packet via the aux port – after
the ﬁrmware has processed it, but before it is actu
ally transmitted. This process is depicted in Figure
3. To synchronize the host and NIC, a simple barrier
can be implemented by spinning on an 802.11 header
ﬁeld (such as duration) that is overwritten by the
ﬁrmware. Alternatively, the host can continuously
overwrite if synchronization is unnecessary. In prac
tice, this “data race” approach, while undeniably
ugly, is both reliable and permits the generation of
arbitrary 802.11 MAC frames. Using this method we
are able to implement any of the attacks previously
described using oﬀ-the-shelf hardware. We believe
we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate this capability using
commodity equipment.
Our prototype, called Swat, consists of an iPAQ
H3600 Pocket PC, running Familiar Linux, with a
DLink DWL-650 PCMCIA 802.11 interface mounted
in a standard PC Card sleeve. The entire device
weighs approximately 375g (a bit over 12 oz) and
is easily concealed in a coat pocket. More modern
Pocket PCs, such as the Toshiba e740/e750 and the
HP iPAQ 5450, include integral 802.11 functionally
and could accomplish the same feats with roughly
half the size and weight.
To experiment with denial-of-service attacks we
have built a demonstration application that pas
sively monitors wireless channels for APs and clients.
Individual clients are identiﬁed initially by their
MAC address, but as they generate traﬃc, a cus
tom DNS resolver and a slightly modiﬁed version of
dsniﬀ [Son] is used to isolate better identiﬁers (e.g.,
userids, DNS address of IMAP server, etc). These
identiﬁers can be used to select individual hosts for
attack, or all hosts may be attacked en masse. The
application and the actual device are pictured in Fig
ure 4.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the
impact of the deauthentication attack and a pre
liminary defense mechanism, followed by a similar
examination of the virtual carrier-sense attack and
defense.
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Figure 4: iPAQ H3600 with Dlink DWL-650 card,
running Swat attack testing tool. Individual clients
and AP’s are identiﬁed either using MAC address or
by passively monitoring the channel and extracting
destination IP addresses and DNS names.

4.2

Deauthentication Attack

Our implementation of this attack promiscu
ously monitors all network activity, including nondata 802.11 frames, and matches the source and des
tination MAC address against a list of attack tar
gets. If a data or association response frame is re
ceived from a target, we issue a spoofed deauthen
tication frame to the access point on behalf of the
client. To avoid buﬀer overﬂow in congested net
works on the attacking machine, deauthentication
frames are rate limited to 10 frames per second per
client. This limit is reset when an access point ac
knowledges receipt of a deauthentication frame.
We tested this implementation in a small 802.11
network composed of 7 machines: 1 attacker, 1 ac
cess point, 1 monitoring station, and 4 legitimate
clients. The access point was built using the Linux
HostAP driver, which provides an in-kernel softwarebased access point. Each of the clients attempted to
transfer, via ftp, a large ﬁle through the access point
machine – a transfer which exceeded the testing pe
riod. We mounted two attacks on the network. The
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ﬁrst, illustrated by the thin rectangle in Figure 5,
was directed against a single client running MacOS
X. This client’s transfer was immediately halted, and
even though the attack lasted less than ten seconds,
the client did not resume transmitting at its previ
ous rate for more than a minute. This ampliﬁcation
was due to a combination of an extended delay while
the client probed for other access points and the ex
ponential backoﬀ being employed by the ftp server’s
TCP implementation.
The second attack, delineated by the wider rect
angle in the same ﬁgure, was directed against all
four clients. Service is virtually halted during this
period, although the Windows XP client is able to
send a number of packets successfully. This anomaly
has two sources. First, these are not data packets
from the ftp session but rather UDP packets used
by Window’s DCE RPC service and not subject to
TCP’s congestion control procedure. Second, there
is a small race condition in our attack implementa
tion between the time a client receives the successful
association response and the time the attacker sends
the deauthentication frame. The WinXP client used
this small window to send approximately ten UDP
packets before the attacking node shut them down.
Modifying the implementation to send the deauthen
tication packets after both authentication and asso
ciation would mitigate this eﬀect.
A number of smaller, directed attacks were per
formed in addition to those in Figure 5. The small
tests were done using the extended 802.11 infrastruc
ture found at UCSD with varied victims. Recent ver
sions of Windows, Linux, and the MacOS all gave up
on the targeted access point and kept trying to ﬁnd
others. Slightly older versions of the same systems
never attempted to switch access points and were
completely disconnected using the less sophisticated
version of the attack. The attack even caused one
device, an HP Jornada Pocket PC, to consistently
crash.
The deauthentication vulnerability can be
solved directly by explicitly authenticating manage
ment frames and dropping invalid requests. How
ever, the standardization of such capabilities is still
some ways oﬀ and it is clear that legacy MAC de
signs do not have suﬃcient CPU capacity to im
plement this functionality as a software upgrade.
Therefore, system-level defenses with low-overhead
can still oﬀer signiﬁcant value. In particular, by
delaying the eﬀects of deauthentication or disasso
ciation requests (e.g., by queuing such requests for
5-10 seconds) an AP has the opportunity to observe
subsequent packets from the client. If a data packet
arrives after a deauthentication or disassociation re-
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Figure 5: Packets sent by each of the 4 client nodes during the deauthentication attack. The ﬁrst attack,
against the MacOS client, started at second 15 and lasted 8 seconds. The second attack against all the clients
started at 101 and lasted for 26 seconds. The attacking node consumes a negligible amount of bandwidth
due to the rate limiting.
quest is queued, that request is discarded – since a le
gitimate client would never generate packets in that
order. The same approach can be used in reverse
to mitigate forged deauthentication packets sent to
the client on behalf of the AP. This approach has
the advantage that it can be implemented with a
simple ﬁrmware modiﬁcation to existing NICs and
access points, without requiring a new management
structure.
To test this defense we modiﬁed the access point
used in our experiments as described above, using a
timeout value of 10 seconds for each management
request. We then executed the previous experiment
again using the “hardened” access point. The equiv
alent results can be seen in Figure 6. From this
graph it is diﬃcult to tell that the attack is active,
and the client nodes continue their activity oblivious
to the misdirection being sent to the access point.
However, our proposed solution is not without
drawbacks. In particular, it opens up a new vulner
ability at the moment in which mobile clients roam
between access points. The association message is
used to determine which AP should receive packets
destined for the mobile client. In certain circum
stances leaving the old association established for
an additional period of time may prevent the rout
ing updates necessary to deliver packets through the
new access point. Or, in the case of an adversary, the
association could be kept open indeﬁnitely by spoof
ing packets from the mobile client to the spoofed AP
– keeping the association current. While both these

22

situations are possible, we will argue that they are
unlikely to represent a new threat in practice.
There are two main infrastructure conﬁgura
tions that support roaming. For lack of a better
name we refer to these as “intelligent” and “dumb”.
In the “intelligent” conﬁguration the access points
have an explicit means of coordination. This coordi
nation can be used to, among other things, update
routes for and transfer buﬀered packets between ac
cess points when a mobile node changes associations.
Since there is not currently a standard for this co
ordination function, AP’s oﬀering such capabilities
typically use proprietary protocols that work only
between homogenous devices. In contrast “dumb”
access points have no explicit means of coordination
and instead rely on the underlying layer-two distri
bution network (typically Ethernet) to reroute pack
ets as a mobile client’s MAC address appears at a
new AP (and hence a new Ethernet switch port).
Intelligent infrastructures, due to their preexist
ing coordination, are easily modiﬁed to avoid the
aforementioned problems caused by the deassocia
tion timeout. Since the mobile node must associate
with the new access point before it can transmit
data, and since the access points are coordinated
(either directly or through a third party), the old
access point can be informed when the mobile node
makes a new association. Based on this informa
tion the old access point can immediately honor the
clients deauthentication request. While an attacker
can spoof packets from the mobile host to create
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Figure 6: Packets sent by each of the 4 client nodes during the deauthentication attack with an access point
modiﬁed to defend against this attack. The ﬁrst attack, against the MacOS client, started at second 10 and
lasted 12 seconds. The second attack against all the clients started at 30 and lasted through the end of the
trace. The attacking node consumes a negligible amount of bandwidth due to the rate limiting.
confusion, this vulnerability exists without the ad
dition of the deferred deassociation mechanisms we
have described.
Dumb infrastructures are slightly more problem
atic because of their lack of coordination and reliance
on the underlying network topology. If that under
lying topology is a broadcast medium, which is a
rarity these days, there is no problem because all
packets are already delivered to all access points. If
the underlying topology is switched, then a proto
col is used (typically a spanning tree distribution
protocol) to distribute which MAC addresses are
served by which ports. Existing switches already
gracefully support moving a MAC address from one
port to another, but have problems when one MAC
address is present across multiple ports. In the non
adversarial case the mobile node will switch access
points, proceed to send data using the new access
point, and cease sending data through the old access
point. From the switches perspective this is equiv
alent to a MAC switching ports. The mobile node
may not receive data packets until it has sent one –
allowing the switch to learn its new port – but that
limitation applies regardless of the deauthentication
timeout. In the adversarial case the attacking node
could generate spoofed traﬃc designed to confuse
the switch. However, this does not represent a sig
niﬁcant new vulnerability – even without the delay
on deauthentication/disassociation an attacker can
spoof a packet from an mobile client in order to cre
ate this conﬂict (including a WEP protected packet
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after key recovery).

4.3

Virtual carrier-sense attack

Motivated by the success of the previous attack,
we built an implementation exploiting the NAV vul
nerability. We generated a variety of packet streams
with a range of large duration values – including con
tinuous runs of RTS frames, CTS frames, and ACK
frames destined for APs, hosts and unallocated ad
dresses. We veriﬁed that packets were being sent as
expected using a separate machine to monitor the
channel being targeted. To our surprise, while our
implementation carried out the attacks faithfully,
they did not have the expected impact. We repeated
these experiments using both Lucent WavePoint II
and Apple Airport Extreme access points and with a
variety of host NIC cards, all with the same results.
After careful examination of traces collected during
these attacks we have come to the conclusion that
most of the devices available to us do not properly
implement the 802.11 MAC speciﬁcation and are im
properly resetting their NAV. In particular, we have
witnessed APs and NICs alike emit packets within
a millisecond after the broadcast of a CTS frame
with a duration of 32767. Figure 7 shows a trace
excerpt illustrating this behavior – the initial CTS
frame should keep the channel idle for 32ms, and
yet after scarcely a millisecond has passed the chan
nel is in use by another host. Such activity should
be impossible under the 802.11 standard since nodes
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Time
1.294020
1.295192
1.296540
1.297869
1.299084
1.300275
1.300439
1.302538
1.306110
1.309543
1.309810
1.312237
1.313452

Src
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.1.2

.10.2
.1.2

Dest
:00:15:01
.1.2
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.10.2
:ea:e7:0f
.10.2
:ea:e7:0f
:00:15:01
:00:15:01
.1.2
:ea:e7:0f
.10.2
:ea:e7:0f

Duration
(ms)
32767
258
0
258
0
258
0
32767
32767
258
0
258
0

Type
802.11 CTS
TCP Data
802.11 Ack
TCP Data
802.11 Ack
TCP Data
802.11 Ack
802.11 CTS
802.11 CTS
TCP Ack
802.11 Ack
TCP Data
802.11 Ack

Figure 7: Excerpt from a typical virtual carrer-sense
attack trace using CTS frames. The addresses have
been shortened for brevity. MAC address :ea:e7:0f
is the access point, and :00:15:01 is an unallocated
MAC address. .1.2 is the uploading client, and .10.2
is the receiving machine. The ﬁrst TCP data frame
is sent 1.1 ms after a CTS that reserved the medium
for > 32 ms. In the second CTS sequence the data
frame is sent after 3.4 ms.

receiving the CTS cannot assume that they will be
able to sense the carrier (or even signiﬁcant radio
energy) since the transmitter may be a hidden ter
minal. We have not conducted a thorough survey of
802.11 gear, so these deﬁciencies may be unique to
the hardware in our environment. However, given
the prevalence of the Choice design we would not be
surprised if this bug is prevalent.
Under the assumption that these bugs will be
removed in future 802.11 products (since they eﬀec
tively prevent RTS/CTS from working as well as the
802.11 Point Coordinator Function and all related
Quality-of-Service services based on 802.11) the re
mainder of this section explores the NAV vulnerabil
ity in the context of the popular ns simulator (which
implements the protocol faithfully).
We implemented the virtual carrier-sense attack
by modifying the ns [NS] 802.11 MAC layer imple
mentation to allow arbitrary duration values to be
sent periodically, 30 times a second, by the attacker.
The attacker’s frames were sent using the normal
802.11 access timing restrictions, which was neces
sary to prevent the attacker from excessively collid
ing with other in-ﬂight frames (and thereby increase
the amount of work required of the attacker). In
addition the attacker was modiﬁed to ignore all du
ration values transmitted from any other node. The
network topology was chosen to mimic many existing
802.11 infrastructure deployments: a single access
point node, through who all traﬃc was being sent,
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18 static client nodes and 1 static attacker node, all
within radio distance of the access point. As with
the previous experiments, ftp was used to generate
the long-lived network traﬃc. We simulated attacks
using ACK frames with large duration values, as well
as the RTS/CTS sequence described earlier. Figure
8 shows the ACK ﬂavor of the virtual carrier-sense
attack in action, but both provided similar results:
the channel is completely blocked for the duration
of the attack.
The virtual carrier-sense attack is much harder
to defend against in practice than the deauthentica
tion attack.
One approach to mitigate its eﬀects is to place a
limit on the duration values accepted by nodes. Any
packet containing a larger duration value is simply
truncated to the maximum value allowable. Strict
adherence to the required use of the NAV feature
indicates two diﬀerent limits: a low cap and a high
cap. The low cap has a value equal to the amount
of time required to send an ACK frame, plus media
access backoﬀs for that frame. The low cap is usable
when the only packet that can follow the observed
packet is an ACK or CTS. This includes RTS and
all management (association, etc) frames. The high
cap, on the other hand, is used when it is valid for a
data packet to follow the observed frame. The limit
in this case needs to include the time required to
send the largest data frame, plus the media access
backoﬀs for that frame. The high cap must be used
in two places: when observing an ACK (because the
ACK my be part of a MAC level fragmented packet)
and when observing a CTS.
We modiﬁed our simulation to add these limits,
assuming that a value of 1500 bytes as the largest
packet. While this is not strictly the largest packet
that can be sent in an 802.11 network, it is the
largest packet sent in practice because 802.11 net
works are typically bridged to Ethernet, which has
a roughly 1500 byte MTU. Figure 9 shows a simula
tion of this defense under the same conditions as the
prior simulation. While there is still signiﬁcant per
turbation, many of the individual sessions are able
to make successful forward progress. However, we
found that simply by increasing the attacker’s fre
quency to 90 packets per second, the network could
still be shut down. This occurs because the attacker
is using ACK frames, whose impact on the NAV is
limited by the high cap.
To further improve upon this result requires us
to abandon portions of the standard 802.11 MAC
functionality. At issue is the inherent trust that
nodes place in the duration value sent by other
nodes. By considering the diﬀerent frame types that
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Figure 8: Results from the ACK based virtual carrier-sense attack simulation with 18 client nodes. The
attack begins at time 40 and ends at time 60. The dark region at the bottom of the graph during the attack
is the attacker.
carry duration values we can deﬁne a new interpre
tation of the duration that allows us to avoid most
possible DoS attacks. The four key frame types that
contain duration values are ACK, data, RTS, and
CTS, and we consider each in turn.
Under normal circumstances the only time a
ACK frame should carry a large duration value is
when the ACK is part of a fragmented packet se
quence. In this case the ACK is reserving the
medium for the next fragment. If fragmentation is
not used then there is no reason to respect the dura
tion value contained in ACK frames. Since fragmen
tation is almost never used (largely due to the fact
that default fragmentation thresholds signiﬁcantly
exceed the Ethernet MTU) removing it from opera
tion altogether will have minimal impact on existing
networks.
Like the ACK frame, the only legitimate occa
sion a data frame can carry a large duration value is
if it is a subframe in a fragmented packet exchange.
Since we have removed fragmentation from the net
work, we can safely ignore the duration values in all
data frames.
The third frame type to be concerned with is
the RTS frame. The RTS frame is only valid in an
RTS-CTS-data transmission sequence. If an RTS is
seen on the network, it follows that the node seeing
the RTS will also be able to observe the data frame.
The 802.11 speciﬁcation precisely deﬁnes the time
a CTS frame, and subsequent data frame, will be
sent. Therefore the duration value in the RTS packet
can be treated speculatively – respected until such
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time as a data frame should be sent. If the data
frame is not observed at the correct time, either the
sender has moved out of range or the RTS request
was spoofed. In either case it is safe for the other
node to undo the impact of this duration on the
NAV. This interpretation is, in fact, allowed under
the existing 802.11 standards.
The last frame to consider is the CTS frame. If
a lone CTS frame is observed there are two possibili
ties: the CTS frame was unsolicited or the observing
node is a hidden terminal. These are the only two
cases possible, since if the observing node was not
a hidden terminal it would have heard the original
RTS frame and it would be handled accordingly. If
the unsolicited CTS is addressed to a valid, in-range
node, then only the valid node knows the CTS is
bogus. It can prevent this attack by responding to
such a CTS with a null function packet containing a
zero duration value – eﬀectively undoing the attack
ers channel reservation. However, if an unsolicited
CTS is addressed to a nonexistent node, or a node
out of radio range, this is indistinguishable from a
legitimate hidden terminal. In this case, there is in
suﬃcient information for a legitimate node to act.
The node issuing the CTS could be an attacker, or
they may simply be responding to a legitimate RTS
request that is beyond the radio range of the ob
server.
An imperfect approach to this ﬁnal situation, is
to allow each node to independently choose to ignore
lone CTS packets as the fraction of time stalled on
such requests increases. Since hidden terminals are
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Figure 9: Results from the ACK based virtual carrier-sense attack simulation with 18 client nodes modiﬁed
to implement defense. The attack begins at time 40 and ends at time 60. The dark region at the bottom of
the graph during the attack is the attacker.
a not a signiﬁcant eﬃciency problem in most net
works (as evidenced by the fact that RTS/CTS are
rarely employed and since the underlying functional
ity does not seem to work in many implementations)
setting this threshold at 30 percent, will provide nor
mal operation in most legitimate environments, but
will prevent an attacker from claiming more than a
third of the bandwidth using this attack.
It should also be noted that existing 802.11 im
plementations use diﬀerent receive and carrier-sense
thresholds. The diﬀerent values are such that, in
an open area, the interference radius of a node is
approximately double its transmit radius. In the
hidden terminal case this means that although the
hidden terminal can not receive the data being trans
mitted, it still detects a busy medium and will not
generate any traﬃc that would interfere with the
data, so the possibility of an unsolicited CTS fol
lowed by an undetectable data packet is very low.
But ultimately the only foolproof solution to
this problem is to extend explicit authentication to
802.11 control packets. Each client-generated CTS
packet contains an implicit claim that it was sent in
response to a legitimate RTS generated by an ac
cess point. However, to prove this claim, the CTS
frame must contain a fresh and cryptographically
signed copy of the originating RTS. If every client
shares keying material with all surrounding access
points it is then possible to authenticate lone CTS
requests directly. However, such a modiﬁcation is
a signiﬁcant alternation to the existing 802.11 stan
dard, and it is unclear if it oﬀers suﬃcient beneﬁts
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relative to its costs. In the meantime, the systemlevel defenses we have described provide reasonable
degrees of protection with extremely low implemen
tation overhead and no management burden. Should
media-access based denial-of-service attacks become
prevalent, these solutions could be deployed quickly
with little eﬀort.

5

Conclusion

802.11-based networks have seen widespread de
ployment across many ﬁelds, mainly due to the
physical conveniences of radio-based communica
tion. This deployment, however, was predicated in
part on the user expectation of conﬁdentiality and
availability. This paper addressed the availability
aspect of that equation. We examined the 802.11
MAC layer and identiﬁed a number of vulnerabili
ties that could be exploited to deny service to legiti
mate users. We described software infrastructure for
generating arbitrary 802.11 frames using commodity
hardware and then used this platform to implement
versions of the deauthentication and virtual carriersense attacks. We found that the former attack
was highly eﬀective in practice, while the latter is
only a theoretical vulnerability due to implementa
tion deﬁciencies in commodity 802.11 gear. In addi
tion to demonstrating the attacks, we described and
analyzed potential countermeasures. These counter
measures represent a stopgap measure, one that can
be implemented with low overhead on existing hard
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ware, but not a long term substitute for appropriate
per-packet authentication mechanisms. Overall, we
believe this paper helps to underscore the care that
must be taken when deploying 802.11 networks in
mission critical applications.
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